

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL ^{e14}

TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN'S NETWORKS

Asia Report N°114 – 5 May 2006

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 20 FEB 2008 200706444

International | **Crisis Group**

WORKING TO PREVENT
CONFLICT WORLDWIDE

---UNCLASSIFIED---

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THE MARRIOTT BOMBING NETWORKS	2
A. THE LUQMANUL HAKIEM SCHOOL	2
B. THE LEFTOVER EXPLOSIVES	3
C. THE NGRUKI LINKS	3
D. THE FINAL TEAM	4
III. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BOMBING	5
A. THE EAST JAVA NETWORK	5
B. THE JI SCHOOL NETWORK IN CENTRAL JAVA.....	7
C. THE NETWORK THUS FAR	9
D. FAMILY AND BUSINESS IN WEST JAVA	9
E. MOBILISING THE NETWORK.....	10
F. THE CONNECTION TO CONFLICT AREAS	10
IV. NOORDIN REACHES OUT TO KOMPAK AND DARUL ISLAM.....	11
A. THE GO-BETWEENS.....	12
B. THE PHILIPPINES CONNECTION.....	12
C. THE MALUKU CONNECTION	13
1. Training in Waimurat, Buru, October 1999	13
2. The KOMPAK office, Ambon 2000-2001	14
3. Training in West Ceram, July 2004	14
D. NOORDIN'S EFFORTS TO BUILD ALLIANCES	14
1. Approaching Sunata and Akram	15
2. Moving to Semarang and Solo	16
3. Sunata refuses.....	16
V. THE LEAD-UP TO BALI II.....	17
VI. CONCLUSION	19
APPENDICES	
A. MAP OF INDONESIA	20
B. MAP OF CENTRAL JAVA	21
C. INDEX OF NAMES.....	22
D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP.....	31
E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA	32
F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.....	34

UNCLASSIFIED

TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN'S NETWORKS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia's most wanted terrorist. In a dramatic pre-dawn raid on 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java, they shot and killed two members of his inner circle and arrested two others. If and when they capture Noordin, they will have put the person most determined to attack Western targets out of commission. But the problem of Noordin's support structure will still have to be tackled.

For four years Noordin has tapped into jihadist networks to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks may be available to others. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the region's largest jihadist organisation, continues to provide the hard core of that following: the two killed in the Wonosobo raid were longstanding JI members, as was at least one of those arrested. But beginning in 2004, Noordin began reaching out to young men from other organisations and some with no previous organisational affiliation.

Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled together – he grandly calls it al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago – as a deviant splinter that has done great harm to the organisation they joined in the mid-1990s. Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI's military wing, even though he answers to no one. He justifies his actions by citing jihadist doctrine that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a group of two or three or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from an imam.

This report examines the way in which Noordin has relied on personal contacts to put his group together. It is based on interrogation depositions, court documents, and Indonesian press reports, with information crosschecked through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources, both official and unofficial.

For the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 2003, he used a small circle of Sumatra-based JI members who had either been associated with a JI school in Malaysia, Lukman al-Hakim, or with its prototype, the al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school in Ngruki, near Solo, Central Java.

alumni of JI schools in Central Java; and a West Java-based faction of an old insurgency, Darul Islam, whose members supplied the key operatives. While individuals from that Ring Banten faction had worked with JI before, military operations had never before been outsourced in this way. It was one indication that Noordin was working on his own.

After the embassy bombing, Noordin was short of funds, weapons and experienced fighters. He turned to two men who had access to all these, neither of whom was JI. One was from a different Darul Islam faction with long experience in the Philippines; the other had been head of the Ambon office of the Islamic charity KOMPAK and could mobilise veterans of Indonesian communal conflicts. Intense negotiations followed with couriers used to relay messages between the bosses. It turned out that neither the Darul Islam nor the KOMPAK leader was interested in joining forces but both were arrested in mid-2005 and began to lose control over their followers, some of whom went over to Noordin.

For the second Bali bombing in October 2005, Noordin relied on his inner circle, including the two who were killed on 29 April, to find and train new members. Recruitment appeared to be rather ad hoc, despite written materials attributed to Noordin suggesting a tightly organised cell structure designed to undertake military operations.

Noordin has shown remarkable determination and capacity to plan operations even as he loses his closest colleagues to police dragnets and remains the target of Indonesia's biggest ever manhunt. It is not clear who among potential successors could do as well.

But his behaviour following Bali II suggests he is running short of money and experienced cadres. The loss on 29 April of the men who served as both couriers and recruiters has to be a significant blow. The Wonosobo raid was a triumph for the police, and Noordin's arrest will be an even greater one. But the networks he drew on will survive as a potential source of recruits for future operations.

For the Australian embassy bombing in September 2004, he relied on three networks: the East Java division of JI;

TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN'S NETWORKS

I. INTRODUCTION

Noordin Mohammed Top remains the most wanted man in Indonesia.¹ Despite four years of dogged police pursuit and a raid on 29 April 2006 that netted some of his closest associates, he has managed not only to evade capture but also to recruit new operatives for spectacular, once-a-year suicide bombings: the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003; the Australian embassy in 2004; and three restaurants in Bali in 2005. The 38-year-old Malaysian national by all accounts is not a particularly impressive figure. For a salafi Muslim, his religious knowledge is limited, and he does not speak Arabic. He is not a skilled orator. He has a knack for surrounding himself with devoted followers who possess skills that he does not, however, and his ability to elude police for so long has enhanced his stature. He can also claim to head the one organisation that actively continues to wage jihad against the U.S. and its allies on Indonesian soil.

That organisation is not Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – at least, not the JI most members would recognise. Noordin and members of his inner circle are JI members. Until 2001 he directed the Luqmanul Hakiem school in Malaysia, headquarters of Mantiqi I, the JI division that covered Malaysia and Singapore. But he increasingly appears to have charted his own path, in a gradual process that began with the 2003 Marriott bombing. By the time of the embassy bombing, he seemed to be operating on his own without reference to the JI central command, although he reportedly still considered himself a member.

He reportedly justifies his actions on the grounds that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a small group or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from its imam. In this way, he may see himself as leading the “real” JI, as opposed to the do-nothings who object to the bombings.

However he justifies it, he is running his own show. His followers began calling themselves *thoifah muqotilah*, Arabic for “fighting force”, in 2005. It was a new use for an old term JI had used to refer to a decentralised special forces unit it planned to set up after the first Bali attack. Noordin seems to have appropriated the term without connection to that initiative.

By about April 2005, according to Indonesian police, Noordin was claiming to head the working group for the Malay archipelago of *Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad*, the formal name of al-Qaeda.² The extent of his actual communication with al-Qaeda is not clear but he certainly seems to have been infatuated with it, aping not only its name but also its materials and tactics. As of mid-2004, he had taken on the nom de guerre of “Aiman”, almost certainly after the al-Qaeda No.2 Aiman Zawaheri. A whole section of a website, www.anshar.net, developed under Noordin's guidance between July and September 2005, was devoted to articles translated into Indonesian from *Sawt al-Jihad*, the al-Qaeda online magazine. Noordin's appearance on a videotape found in November 2005, complete with balaclava covering his face, seemed to be an effort to replicate the videos made by Zarqawi, the prominent insurgent in Iraq.

Noordin's ties to Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, the Bali bomber, remain strong. Noordin reportedly idolises the East Java-born preacher, who was his mentor in Mantiqi I and is also a hafez – one who has memorised the Koran. Mukhlas, while on death row in Bali, continued to give his protégé materials for religious discussion groups, thanks to the lax controls on communications within Indonesian prisons. If Noordin is not convincing as a religious scholar, Mukhlas is, and through a variety of media, printed and electronic, his teachings can be –

¹ For related reporting on Indonesia see Crisis Group Asia Report N°103, *Weakening Indonesian Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso*, 13 October 2005; Asia Report N°92, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Danul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, 22 February 2005; Asia Report N°74, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, 3 February 2004; Asia Report N°63, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003; Asia Report N°43, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*, 11 December 2002; and Asia Briefing N°20, *Al-Qaeda in South East Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia*, 8 August 2002 (as corrected 10 January 2003).

and almost certainly were – used for recruitment and indoctrination.³

Since Bali II, Noordin has suffered setbacks. In November 2005, he lost a key members of his team, the master bomb-maker Azhari Husin, during a police siege in East Java; eight followers were arrested in Semarang, not far from the site of the April raid. But his group survived and even grew because of the networks he was able to tap into for shelter, logistical assistance, and recruits.

These networks have changed over time, reflecting Noordin's increasing distance from JI. For the Marriott bombing, all major operatives were Sumatra-based JI members. For the Australian embassy bombing, Noordin turned to the JI network in East Java, JI schools in Central Java and a Darul Islam group in West Java that had worked with JI in the past but was a separate entity with its own chain of command. The actual bombing was carried out by the latter in a kind of outsourcing operation that was at odds with standard JI practice.

For protection after the embassy attack, Noordin increasingly relied on networks that included but went far beyond JI, taking in non-JI veterans of the two big communal conflicts in Indonesia, Ambon (Maluku) and Poso. He also used those veterans' networks to reach out to two non-JI figures, KOMPAK leader Abdullah Sunata and Darul Islam leader Akram alias Shamsuddin alias Taufikurrahman. They refused to join him, and by mid-2005, both were under arrest.⁴

The Bali II bombings of 1 October 2005 suggest that once Sunata and Akram were behind bars, their control over their followers loosened, allowing Noordin to bring some of them on board. By early 2006 he was trying to turn his ad hoc band into a more structured armed force that could operate beyond Java and, at least in his dreams, beyond Indonesia.

II. THE MARRIOTT BOMBING NETWORKS

The 2003 Marriott Bombing provides the first case study of how Noordin used personal networks. Plans for that operation developed almost by accident, but as they did, Noordin relied heavily on people he knew and trusted – almost all JI members and many associated with the Luqmanul Hakim school in Johor, Malaysia.

A. THE LUQMANUL HAKIEM SCHOOL

Luqmanul Hakiem opened in 1992 on JI founder Abdullah Sungkar's instruction, with Mukhlas as its director. It was directly modelled on the al-Mukmin *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Ngruki, Central Java that Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had founded twenty years earlier. It adopted the Ngruki curriculum wholesale and had the same aim of developing new cadres to wage jihad; moreover, many of its teachers were Ngruki alumni.⁵ After JI's establishment in 1993, the school became the nerve centre of Mantiqi I, most of whose leading members were associated with it in some way. All the best known JI bombers – Hambali, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Zulkarnaen, Faturrahman al-Ghozi, Dulmatin, Imam Samudra, Azhari and Noordin himself – either taught, lectured or studied there. It taught young women as well as young men, and Hambali was not the only senior JI member who found a wife there. At its height it had about 350 students.

Noordin began to attend lectures there around 1995, when he was studying for a master's degree at the nearby Universiti Teknologi Malaysia; he did not join JI until early 1998.⁶ When it was clear that Luqmanul Hakiem needed a Malaysian national as director to stay open, Noordin took the job, although Mukhlas remained the dominant figure.

In late 2001, a crackdown on JI in Malaysia began, and Luqmanul Hakiem ceased operations by early 2002. Noordin left for Riau, Indonesia early in the year, and in mid-2002 he and his Indonesian brother-in-law, a Luqmanul Hakiem graduate named Mohamed Rais, moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra with their families and opened a repair shop for automobile shock absorbers.⁷

³ Mukhlas was moved from Bali to a maximum security prison in Central Java in October 2005 after Bali II, and controls may be tighter now.

⁴ Abdullah Sunata was arrested for weapons possession and failing to disclose information about Noordin's whereabouts. Akram was involved in a 2000 bombing in Yogyakarta.

⁵ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, March 2006.

⁶ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006.

⁷ Rais and Noordin would have known each other at Luqmanul Hakiem for at least six years. Rais was an Indonesian national whose family lived in Malaysia, in the village where JI founder Abdullah Sungkar and his entourage settled in 1985. He joined JI in 1995 when he turned fifteen and was sent to Ngruki to complete his education. After graduating in 1998, he returned to

They hired Ismail, another Luqmanul Hakiem graduate, and in November 2002, a month after the first Bali bombing, Azhari Husin joined them at Noordin's invitation.

B. THE LEFTOVER EXPLOSIVES

The accidental trigger for the Marriott bombing came in December 2002. As police stepped up their hunt for JI members in the aftermath of Bali, Toni Togar, a JI member based in Medan, North Sumatra, got nervous, because his house stored all the explosives left over from JI's December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings. He contacted Noordin to tell him he was going to throw them out. The question is why he chose Noordin, rather than his immediate superior in the JI organisation, the head of the *wakalah*, who apparently was reachable.

The answer may give a clue to Noordin's subsequent activities. The team that carried out the Christmas Eve bombings was led by Hambali and included Imam Samudra and many of the 2002 Bali bombers. From the beginning these men were operating outside the JI administrative structure, not even part of its special forces unit, *laskar khos*, that reported directly to Zulkarnaen, the person on the central command responsible for military affairs. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was aware of Hambali's activities, but most *wakalah* members were not, and people like Toni Togar were often selected to take part without the knowledge of their division leaders.⁸ Hambali had thus set a precedent for a secret team pursuing jihad on its own. This was probably in part because he controlled separate funding, including from al-Qaeda.⁹

Toni Togar and Azhari had both been members of Hambali's team, and while it is not clear how Noordin got involved, it was logical for Togar to convey his plans to dispose of the explosives to someone within this circle. Noordin, however, saw good materials being wasted and

forbade the disposal, saying the explosives could still be used, and he would arrange to take them.¹⁰ Before he could do so, however, Toni Togar showed up at the shop in Bukittinggi and told Noordin and Rais that he had already moved the materials to the house of a JI member in Dumai, Riau.

C. THE NGRUKI LINKS

In January 2003, Rais, Noordin and Azhari moved to Bengkulu, where a group of JI members lived, including Asmar Latin Sani, who became the Marriott suicide bomber. Noordin and Azhari planned the bombing there as a way of putting the explosives to good use. JI members in Bengkulu, Lampung, and Riau were involved in some planning and logistical support but were not told the target.

Interestingly, Noordin began to plan for a spectacular attack with some of the Bengkulu members just as others from their *wakalah* were taking part in a program to refresh their military skills, as a response to the exposure and arrests that followed the Bali bombings.¹¹ For most of the top JI leadership, this was a time for training and consolidation – not new attacks. But Hambali had set the precedent of going off on his own, and Noordin followed it.

The next stages of the operation involved small teams with ties to one another beyond the JI affiliation. Getting the explosives from Dumai to Bengkulu via Pekanbaru, Riau, in February 2003 and securing additional materials such as detonators involved Noordin, Azhari, Rais, Toni Togar, and a new team member, Masrizal bin Ali Umar

Malaysia to teach at Luqmanul Hakiem and joined the subdivision (*wakalah*) of JI's Mantiqi I in Johor. He remained there until February 2002 when his other Malaysian brother-in-law was arrested as a member of a JI affiliate, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), which consisted of Malaysian nationals, many of whom were members of the Malaysian opposition political party, PAS. JI reportedly did not want to seem as if it were poaching from PAS, so it encouraged those interested in JI to form their own organisation. Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, March 2006.

⁸ For reference to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's involvement in discussions of plans for the Christmas Eve bombings, see statement of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, 30 April 2002 in case dossier of Abdul Aziz bin Sihabudin, No. Pol. BP/364/XII/2002 /SERSE/, Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Daerah Riau Negeri Bareleng.

⁹ Van Gorkom, *The Second Front* (Jakarta, 2005), p. 112.

¹⁰ Indictment of Mohamed Rais in South Jakarta District Court, No.PDM-51/JKTS/01/2004.

¹¹ The training was part of a central command decision to try to coordinate training activities with military operations. Mustofa was responsible for training, Zulkarnaen for military affairs, and they did not get along. Individuals kept weapons caches and did not share them with JI as a whole for training. Hambali snatched *fiah* (cell) members without informing the relevant *wakalah* heads and used them for operations which bore no relevance to their training. In an effort to move beyond egos, reduce confusion, and base training on a coherent military strategy, the acting amir, Abu Rusdan, approved a single central command coordinating post to oversee training and military functions, with a direct administrative line through the *mantiqis* to the *wakalahs*. Trained military units at *wakalah* level were to be known as *thoifah muqotilah*, the original use of the term. Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, March-April 2006. Only Mantiqi II actually got a training program based on the new structure underway in early 2003 but it was discovered by police in June 2003 and many of the participants were arrested. See expert witness testimony of Billy Herman SH, 12/12/2003 Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, Direktorat VI Anti-Terror in case dossier of Solihin alias Rofi. (Asman refers to the units as the *fiah* and *thoifah*.)

alias Tohir, another Ngruki alumnus and Luqmanul Hakiem teacher. He was a close friend of Rais and would have been trusted completely by the others.

After the explosives reached Bengkulu safely as unaccompanied baggage on an ordinary intercity bus, they were stored at the house of Sardona Siliwangi, another Ngruki student and JI member. At the time the Marriott plot was being hatched, Sardona, who lived in Bengkulu, was working with Asmar Latin Sani to set up a new Ngruki-like *pesantren* there, and it was he who opened a bank account in March 2003 to facilitate financial transactions for Noordin. That said, he does not seem to have been an enthusiastic team member; it was more that once asked to help, he could not refuse.¹² Noordin only formally asked him to join in early April, and while he initially agreed, he only lasted a few weeks before he decided the demands on his time were too onerous and backed out. Noordin apparently had not shared significant details with him except how to communicate via codes and passwords.¹³

The police were never far behind: Rais was arrested in late April 2003, Sardona in May. The difficulties of mounting an operation had to be severely compounded by knowledge that the police would obtain more information from those in custody but it did not deter Noordin any more than his plans for the Australian embassy attack were affected by the arrests of close associates just before.

In late April, another JI member from Riau was drawn in: Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias Gembrot alias Idris. He had been involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in Pekanbaru and was a natural choice to help, albeit in a relatively minor role: transporting the explosives yet again.

In May, two tried and trusted team members returned. Toni Togar, whose reluctance to keep the explosives set the whole plot in motion, robbed a bank in Medan on 6 May to raise funds for the project. Ismail, the Luqmanul Hakiem alumnus who had worked with Rais and Noordin in the shock absorber repair shop in Bukittinggi, got an email from Noordin asking him to pick up some packages from a man in Dumai. Ismail did so, and the packages turned out to be cash in Australian dollars, sent by Hambali via a courier.¹⁴ Ismail then got a series of instructions from

Noordin on how to bring the cash from Dumai to Lampung.¹⁵

Table 1 summarises the school ties of the operatives:

Table 1: Education of Marriott Bombers (names in bold are those most commonly used)

Noordin Moh. Top	Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998-2002
Azhari Husin	Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998-2002
Indrawarman alias Toni Togar	Ngruki, 1987-1990
Mohammed Rais	Ngruki, 1991-1995; Luqmanul Hakiem, 1996-1999, 2001-2002
Asmar Latin Sani	Ngruki, 1991-1995
Ismail alias Mohamed Ikhwan	Luqmanul Hakiem, 1991-1998
Sardona Siliwangi	Ngruki, 1993-1997; Universitas an-Nur, 2000-2002
Masrizal bin Ali Umar alias Tohir	Ngruki, 1990-1994; Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998, 2000
Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias Idris	Ngruki, 1989-1993

D. THE FINAL TEAM

On 4 June 2003, in Lampung, the final team was put together: Noordin, Azhari, Ismail, Asmar Latin Sani, and Tohir. Noordin assigned the tasks. He explained that he was in charge, with Azhari as field commander and Ismail his assistant. Asmar and Tohir would rent the house, buy the vehicles and get the explosives to Jakarta. Asmar had agreed to be the martyr.

When they got to Jakarta, they split into two teams to survey four possible targets. Azhari and Ismail examined the Marriott and a Citibank branch; Noordin and Tohir looked at the Jakarta International School and the Australian International School. Eventually they decided on the hotel because of the American brand name and the fact that it was easy to reach. The bombing took place on 5 August.

¹² Interrogation deposition of Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona Bin Azwar, 28 August 2003.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ A book that appears based in part on transcripts of Hambali's interrogation says Hambali arranged for \$25,000 to be sent: \$15,000 for operational expenses, \$10,000 for Bali bomber families. Conboy, op. cit., p. 229. Hambali's younger brother Gungun, who was arrested in Karachi in September 2003, testified Hambali had secured a promise of \$50,000 from an

Arab in Pakistan, which was sent via couriers to Thailand and on to Malaysia where some was to support families of arrested KMM members. The money that reached Indonesia may have been from the same source. See interrogation deposition of Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan alias Abdul Hadi, 20 January 2004 in case dossier of Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan alias Abdul Hadi, No. Pol BP/04/III/2004 Den Sus 88 Anti Teror.

¹⁵ Interrogation deposition of Ismail alias Muhammad Ikhwan alias Agus alias Iwan, 28 January 2004 in case dossier of Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan, op. cit.

Noordin used only JI members – in fact, a subset of JI members who were Sumatra-based alumni of either Ngruki, Luqmanul Hakiem or both. The question is whether the Marriott bombing was JI-endorsed. That members of the central command were apprised is clear: on 7 June, according to Ismail's testimony, Noordin met the secretary of the central command, Abu Dujanah (an Indonesian national who had taught at Luqmanul Hakiem), and Qotadah alias Basyir, a senior member of Mantiqi II who had been involved in the post-Bali military refresher course. (He appears to have been the only JI person involved in that program who went over to Noordin.) That evening, Noordin, Azhari and the two visitors talked in a hotel, then Ismail escorted them back to Jakarta. In late August, after the bombing, Noordin and Azhari met them again in Bandung and talked late into the evening.

Noordin and Abu Dujanah remain at large, Qotadah's whereabouts are unknown and Azhari is dead, so the substance of their conversation remains unknown. Either Noordin asked Abu Dujanah, as secretary of the central command, to get the command's endorsement for the operation, or he simply approached Abu Dujanah, as part of the Luqmanul Hakiem circle, believing he would be sympathetic to the go-it-alone approach and might be in a position to assist. His argument would almost certainly have been the one he had tried with Sardona earlier, "Our enemies will destroy us if we don't destroy them first".¹⁶

As noted, this argument was unacceptable to many JI members, who believed the Bali bombing had been a disastrous misstep. But Abu Dujanah, according to one source, gave highest priority to protecting fellow JI members and whatever he thought of the Marriott operation, he tried to mobilise the JI network to protect the perpetrators.¹⁷

III. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BOMBING

For the embassy attack, Noordin put his team together using three networks: JI's East Java division; the informal alumni association of JI schools in and around Solo, Central Java; and an offshoot of the old Darul Islam organisation based in Banten and West Java provinces.

Once identified, one or two men from each of these networks went through their personal networks to mobilise others, relying as often on family, business, neighbourhood, professional, or school ties as on organisational affiliation, though it is sometimes difficult to make the distinction. Affiliation with JI or DI often leads to intermarriage and joint business operations among members. But these ties above and beyond the organisational structure mean the networks can be activated and loyalties invoked whether or not the organisation is functioning or an action is endorsed by a particular leader.

For this mission, the most interesting question is how the East/Central Java and West Java networks merged, and here, it seems, Ambon experience may have been key. It came down to Noordin asking a young follower in Solo in April 2004 where he could find additional operatives with a proven commitment to jihad, and the young man replying, in effect, "I know someone in Bandung who might be able to help..." That person was Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois, who took charge of the logistics and finding the suicide bomber for the 9 September 2004 operation. Before examining how Noordin established contact with Rois, it is worth looking at how the three networks functioned.

A. THE EAST JAVA NETWORK

By late 2003, in the aftermath of the Marriott bombing and the intensified police activity, Noordin and Azhari needed sanctuary. Through October, they hid in the Bandung area, but by November had made their way back to Solo, where they made contact with Usman bin Sef alias Fahim, the head of the JI *wakalah* for East Java. Fahim was wanted by the police for a range of JI-related activities and was hiding in the Solo area. But as a respected Islamic teacher (*ustadz*); as head of Darussalam Foundation, the JI front in Surabaya, East Java's capital; and as the *wakalah* leader, he could issue instructions to JI members in Surabaya and expect to be obeyed.

In November, Fahim summoned a man named Son Hadi from Surabaya to Solo. A 1991 Ngruki graduate, Son Hadi had worked alongside Fahim in the Darussalam Foundation since 1997. Fahim told him that hiding Noordin and Azhari was a good deed and instructed him to find a place for them in Surabaya.

¹⁶ Interrogation deposition of Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona bin Azwar, 28 August 2003.

¹⁷ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, March 2006. There has been much press speculation about whether Abu Dujanah has assumed the role of JI amir. Crisis Group sources say he has not. But he is one member of the central command who since 2003 has remained in a position to take decisions and, when necessary, communicate with others. Zulkarnaen was out of contact; Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abu Rusdan, Ahmad Roichan and Mustofa were under arrest; Ustadz Arif was weak. A source suggested Abu Dujanah, if left to his own devices, would probably not use JI resources for Noordin-style bombings but there is no evidence that he tried to stop his colleagues.

Son Hadi returned home and contacted three friends, who knew each other through religious study but who were also likely fellow members of JI.¹⁸ On 18 November, he rented a minivan with money collected as *infaq* (contributions) from the Muslim community in Surabaya.¹⁹ He and a friend drove to Mojoagung, a town about an hour and half from Surabaya, to meet Fahim, Noordin and Azhari. All drove to a pre-arranged spot in the city, where the other two friends, one named Ismail, were waiting with motorcycles. They took Noordin and Azhari to Ismail's house, and everything was fine for about a month.

Then Ismail's father decided to visit, and Ismail said the men would have to move. Son Hadi contacted another friend, Achmad Hasan, who lived in Blitar, also in East Java. Hasan had been inducted into JI by Fahim in 1996 but he also had a commercial connection to Son Hadi: their wives ran a business making and selling Muslim headscarves (*jilbab*).²⁰

In January 2004, another operative entered the picture. Heri Sigu Samboja alias Ilyasa was a 22-year-old Ngruki graduate and religious teacher at the Darul Fitroh *pesantren* in Sukaharjo, outside Solo. His father, Khumaidi, was an Afghan veteran and friend of Fahim's.²¹ Fahim apparently contacted Khumaidi about sending his son to study with Azhari in Blitar. According to Heri's statement to police, his father came to the *pesantren* where he was teaching and offered to send him to study computers and learn how to make viruses that would wreck American data systems. Heri was not particularly interested; he preferred, he said, to go for jihad to Poso or Mindanao. His father said it was

very difficult because surveillance was tight and asked him to go instead to Solo to see about the computer study. Heri left the following day, went to a designated meeting place at the house of a religious teacher where he met another young man. The teacher then took the two of them to see Fahim.²²

"Do you know why you've come here?", Fahim asked.

"To study computers", Heri replied.

"Well, actually to study electronics", Fahim said. "Are you prepared to do this?"²³

They said they were. It must have been clear to both young men that they would be engaged in clandestine activity but they may not have known, nor did Heri's father necessarily know, what lay in store.

Heri went back to his *pesantren* and asked leave from the director, telling him, as Fahim had instructed, that he was going to Poso to teach. A few days later, his father picked him up and sent him to Blitar, giving a number to call when they arrived. The number turned out to be Hasan's, who took them from the bus terminal to his house. They were introduced to Noordin and Azhari, both using false names, and told that they were there to study bomb-making.

Heri and his fellow student embarked on a month-long, seven-hours-a-day course with Azhari in Hasan's home. A few weeks after they arrived, Fahim called Hasan and instructed him to go to the main mosque in Kediri, a city about two hours away. Fahim was waiting there with two other men – Adung, an old associate of Hambali's from Malaysia who replaced him as head of Mantiqi I and became a member of the JI central command, and Qotadah, the man who, with Abu Dujanah, met Noordin before and after the Marriott bombing.

They all drove back to Blitar, and it turned out that the visitors had come bearing gifts: 25 kilograms of potassium chlorate and ten kilos of sulphur for bomb making, as well as a pistol and ammunition. Not long afterwards, another visitor delivered about 30 kilograms of TNT.

Sometime in early February 2004, Heri and his fellow bomb-making apprentice were deemed to have completed their studies and were sent home. Adung and Qotadah

¹⁸ The three were Ustadz Anton alias Pak Lik, Ismail, and Jauhari. Anton was a fellow participant in a religious study circle at the al-Ikhsan mosque in Surabaya, where Son Hadi was a regular preacher (*khatib*) and which also appears to have been a centre of JI activities. Son Hadi told the police Ismail, who agreed to put the men up, was also a frequent participant in his study sessions, meaning he was also likely active in the JI *wakalah*. Jauhari was part of the same circle, but his exact relationship with Son Hadi is not clear.

¹⁹ Interrogation deposition of Son Hadi in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.

²⁰ JI women appear to be important in supporting the activities of the organisation through making and selling Muslim clothing. The wife of Agus Dwikarna (a member of Laskar Jundullah, not JI) was also active in this business, selling in the southern Philippines as well as Indonesia. One factory outside Solo reportedly had difficulties when the woman who ran it, the wife of a Ngruki teacher, was accused by her employees of paying sweatshop wages.

²¹ Fahim was in the 1987 intake of Afghanistan trainees but he made a visit to Mindanao in November 1987; it is not clear when Khumaidi was in Afghanistan but they may have been there at the same time.

²² The teacher was Ustadz Hasbi. The second young man was Ilyas alias Tukiadi.

²³ Interrogation deposition of Heri Sigu Samboja alias Nery Anshori alias Mohamad al Ansori alias Mohammad Nuruddin alias Ilyasa als Akhi Shogir alias Jamaluddin alias Azmi als Son Hadi alias Abdul Fatah, 12 November 2004, in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.

accompanied Heri to Solo. At least at this stage, Noordin seemed still to have the backing of the members of the central command most associated with Mantiqi I.

Heri informed his father the next day that he had joined for jihad with Noordin and Dr Azhari. Under the circumstances, this was unlikely to have come as a surprise. He returned to teaching at the Darul Fitroh *pesantren* but stayed in touch with Adung.

Shortly thereafter, Hasan called Son Hadi to tell him that Noordin and Azhari would have to leave his house and take their lethal materials with them. At that point, Son Hadi called an old friend, Chandra alias Farouk, who lived in Pasuruan, East Java, and asked if he could put up two guests. Chandra and Son Hadi had known each other since 1996 when both were studying in Bangil, East Java, and had subsequently become partners in a business to collect and sell used cloth for industrial purposes – another example of JI business ties.²⁴

After Noordin and Azhari moved to Pasuruan, Son Hadi got a call summoning him to Solo to meet with Adung. He was told to bring the respected teacher Abu Fida, another member of JI's East Java *wakalah* and the son of the director of the mosque where many JI activities took place. The meeting was apparently tense. Son Hadi reported that he had moved the two fugitives. This was the first Adung knew of this, and he demanded to know who Chandra was. He told Son Hadi that henceforth, he, Adung, and not Fahim, Son Hadi's superior in the JI structure, was responsible for safeguarding the men, and Abu Fida, not Son Hadi, would be the local man in charge. He ordered Son Hadi to give Chandra's telephone number to Abu Fida and then sent him back to Surabaya.

Abu Fida took over responsibility for the two men and in April 2004 ordered Hasan to go to Chandra's house in Pasuruan, pick up Azhari and take him back to Hasan's house in Blitar. Heri, the young religious teacher, moved in with him. Noordin, who seems to have stayed in the Surabaya area, visited him there twice in May and June.

In May, Noordin asked Hasan's help in meeting Munfiatun, a young woman who had expressed interest in marrying a mujahid – a warrior for Islam. She would be his second

wife; he was still married to Mohamed Rais's sister from Riau. Noordin had heard about Munfiatun through Hasan, since she was a friend and former roommate of Hasan's wife when they were university students in Malang.²⁵ Adung performed the wedding ceremony, with Hasan and Abu Fida in attendance. Abu Fida then gave Hasan a long detonating cord to take back to Azhari in Blitar.

By mid-June, Azhari had another bomb-making student, Gempur Budi Angkoro alias Jabir, a Ngruki graduate and cousin of the legendary Faturrahman al-Ghozi, the JI operative and Hambali associate killed in the Philippines in 2003. Jabir was one of the two killed in the April 2006 raid in Wonosobo. He stayed with Azhari until 5 July 2004 and later became an important member of Noordin's inner circle, reportedly helping recruit the Bali II suicide bombers.

The next day, Adung and Fahim were arrested in Solo. When Hasan heard, he immediately took Azhari, Heri, and all the bomb-making materials back to Pasuruan, where Chandra found them another place to stay. Jabir and Noordin joined them a few days later, and they all stayed there until they left together for Jakarta on 22 July.

B. THE JI SCHOOL NETWORK IN CENTRAL JAVA

The second network that came into play was the web of JI schools across Indonesia, with three of the most important in the Solo area: al-Mukmin in Ngruki; Darusysyahada in Boyolali; and Mahad Aly, otherwise known as Universitas an-Nur, in Solo itself. Many involved in the embassy bombing were alumni of these three schools.

Table 2: Education of Embassy Bombers

Son Hadi	Ngruki 1988-1991
Syaifuddin Umar alias Abu Fida	Lecturer, Universitas an-Nur 2000-2002
Gempur Budi Angkoro alias Jabir	Ngruki 1993-1996; Darusysyahada 1996-1998, taught 99-04
Suranto alias Muhammad Faiz alias Deni	Ngruki 1992-1995; al-Husein (Indramayu, also JI school) 1995-1997; an-Nur 2000-2003
Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah	al-Muttaqien (Jepara, also JI school) 1990-1996; an-Nur 2000-2003
Lutfi Haidaroh alias Ubeid	Ngruki 1992-1995; Darusysyahada 1995-1998; an-Nur 2000-2003

²⁴ Son Hadi told police Chandra was known as an NII (Darul Islam) activist when they were in Bangil, so he may not have been a JI member. Interrogation deposition of Son Hadi bin Muhadjir, 15 December 2004 in case dossier of Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. Another connection to Bangil comes up below: Joni Achmad Fauzan, a man who helped hide Noordin in early 2005 and joined him, went to school in Bangil around the same time as Chandra and Son Hadi, and was a Ngruki alumnus, so may have known Son Hadi there.

²⁵ Interrogation deposition of Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo, 9 December 2004, in case dossier of Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. Munfiatun had been a student at Brawijaya University in Malang.

Heri alias Umar (Ubeid's brother)	an-Nur
Heri Sigu Samboja alias al-Anshori	Ngruki 2002-2003

Urwah, Ubeid, and Deni in the above table were all classmates at an-Nur, and Abu Fida had been their teacher. In March 2004, according to Urwah, he and Ubeid were summoned from Solo to Surabaya by Abu Fida on the pretext of helping develop a concept for the construction of a new *pesantren*. They left immediately and at the designated meeting place, a house owned by Abu Fida, they found their old classmate Deni.²⁶ (Deni was a preacher for the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya from 1997 to 2000, meaning he would have been part of the *JI wakalah* under Fahim. He was also known as Abu Dujanah's courier.²⁷) Abu Fida introduced Urwah and Ubeid to Noordin.

Sometime in April 2004, Urwah and Ubeid moved to the house in Surabaya and over the next three months engaged in long discussions with Noordin about the need to make war on *kafirs* (infidels, understood by many salafi Muslims as meaning all non-Muslims) in general, the U.S. and its allies in Indonesia in particular.²⁸ There was no need to go to Iraq or Afghanistan; the jihad could be waged at home.²⁹ Noordin stressed that for the jihad to succeed, groups had to work together, and one person he wanted to draw in was Abdullah Sunata of KOMPAK, who probably knew more experienced veterans of the Ambon and Poso conflicts than anyone else in Indonesia.³⁰

It was at this point that Noordin's ties to the *JI* institutional structure began to weaken. Once he began actively

recruiting his own people, he further alienated the leadership of the *JI* mainstream.³¹

As Noordin, Urwah and Ubeid discussed the need to find committed mujahidin, Urwah mentioned Iwan alias Rois from Bandung, a Darul Islam fighter whom he had known at least since 2002, when Rois came to Universitas an-Nur about enrolling his brother.³² Noordin apparently had met Rois earlier, in Ambon or Mindanao.³³ He ordered Urwah to reestablish contact and explore how far he would be willing to take part in a jihad. Urwah called Rois in early May, and they arranged to meet in Solo.

Two days later, at the mosque on the an-Nur campus, Urwah drew him out on his attitudes toward the U.S and its allies and their interests in Indonesia. He concluded Rois had both sufficient religious knowledge and the proper spirit for jihad that would make him a good member of the team.

Urwah returned to Surabaya and reported the conversation to Noordin, who made no comment but a week later told Urwah to meet Rois again and to deliver a letter. At the same mosque in Solo, Urwah handed over the letter; Rois read it, and sent back a response via Urwah.

We do not know the contents of the letter, but it appears to have led Rois, within weeks at the end of May, to set up a new military training camp in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java, specifically designed to select suicide bombers. Most participants had undergone earlier training that Rois conducted in 2003, among them Heri Golun, who later detonated the bomb in front of the Australian embassy. Two weeks into the new training, Ubeid's younger brother, Heri alias Umar, and other men from outside West Java arrived. Deni was already there, having been sent by Urwah shortly after his meeting with Rois in Solo.³⁴ Deni and Umar – who was arrested in

²⁶ Interrogation deposition of Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, 21 September 2004, in case dossier of Irun Hidayat, Polri Daerah Metro Jakarta dan Sekitarnya, Direktorat Reserse Kriminal Umum, 2005.

²⁷ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006.

²⁸ Interrogation deposition of Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, op. cit.

²⁹ Interrogation deposition of Purnama Putra alias Usman alias Usamah alias Ipong alias Risqy alias Uus alias Tikus, 14 July 2005, p. 19, in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias Arnold, Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti-Terror. It may not be a coincidence that around this time a pamphlet was circulating in jihadist groups that was a translation from Arabic into Indonesian of an article that first appeared in the al-Qaeda on-line magazine Sawt al-Jihad. Entitled "You Don't Need to Go to Iraq for Jihad", it was written in 2003 by a Saudi jihadist, Muhammad bin Ahmad as-Salim.

³⁰ Interrogation deposition of Purnama Putra, op. cit., p. 19. Noordin did not meet Sunata until after the embassy bombing but Sunata appears to have authorised his followers to secure materials for the bomb, including the detonating cord Abu Fida provided after Noordin's wedding. Ibid., p. 20.

³¹ The *JI* administrative manual, known as PUPJI, authorises working with other organisations but not to the point of ignoring the *JI* hierarchy.

³² All Urwah says is that he first met Iwan alias Rois in Solo in 2002, when the latter came to his dormitory at Universitas an-Nur and left his card, with the name and telephone of the Sajira courier company. Ubaid and Rois were in Mindanao doing training at the same time but in different camps and may not have met.

³³ A source said Ambon but could not remember when Noordin was there. Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006. Urwah's testimony suggests Mindanao.

³⁴ Deni says Urwah told him he was needed as a religious instructor for a month but did not give any details, only that Rois would explain when he got to Bandung. See deposition of Muhammad Faiz alias Deni alias Ahmad in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. The man who joined the training in

early 2006 for withholding information about Noordin's whereabouts – provided the religious instruction, and Rois and his wife's uncle, Saptono, led the military drills. The training focused on *fa'i* (robbing non-Muslims to raise funds for jihad), and included simulated robbing of a house. Deni said he did not know who organized or paid for the training, although Rois testified in late 2004 that the funds came from his uncle, himself, and the income from unlicensed gold mining in the area.³⁵

During the training, Ubeid and Urwah visited to see how it was going. Urwah gave Rois a mini-revolver with four 2.2 caliber bullets as a gift from Noordin.

C. THE NETWORK THUS FAR

Noordin had thus far drawn on Fahim and his East Java network, where one link, from Fahim to Son Hadi, brought in at least five and probably six people involved in hiding the two fugitives: Anton, Ismail, Jauhari, Chandra, Hasan and Deni. All except for Chandra would have known both Fahim and Son Hadi through the JP's East Java *wakalah* and the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya, although there were other bonds, such as that between the wives of Son Hadi and Hasan. Chandra was a friend and business partner of Son Hadi's, but it is not clear whether he moved in the same jihadist circles.

The recruitment of bomb-makers appears to have been a much more personal process. Fahim appears to have used his Afghan connections to get to Heri Sigu Samboja's father and then the son. Jabir had a blue-blood jihadist lineage, but he also seems to have been recruited individually.

The friendship among three graduates of Universitas an-Nur, Urwah, Ubaid, and Deni and their loyalty to their former instructor, Abu Fida, were instrumental to setting up the most critical part of the operation, recruitment of the field operatives from West Java. This link depended on one critical tie, from Urwah and Ubaid to Rois, and we still do not know exactly where it was forged. But the personal links among the West Java operatives are the most interesting.

D. FAMILY AND BUSINESS IN WEST JAVA

When Urwah contacted Iwan alias Rois, he probably had no idea that he was tapping into a whole clan of Darul Islam members. Two families proved particularly important for the embassy bombing. One was that of

Rois's wife, Wiwit. Her father, Awal Purnomo, was born in Cianjur, the eldest of nine children. Two of his brothers, Kang Jaja alias Aqdam and Saptono, became involved in Darul Islam in the 1980s. Awal himself was inducted as a member only in 1993, at the age of 39. Kang Jaja was the most committed of the three brothers, and it was he who began military training of DI members in West Java with the help of some Afghan veterans.³⁶

In 1998, Kang Jaja founded the CV Sajira courier company as a three-man partnership between himself, his brother Awal, and a third Darul Islam fighter, Heri Hafidin, with the idea that the company would both live up to the ideals of Darul Islam and provide wherewithal for its struggle.³⁷ He personally financed training for his cadres in Mindanao and in late 1999 sent a group of nine, including his nephew, Rois, and his brother, Saptono.

Another in that batch was Rosihin Noor, who became one of the most militant of the group and the shooting instructor in Kang Jaja's military training sessions. Rosihin married into the second big family involved in the Kuningan bomb. The patriarch, Engkos Kosasih alias Pak Kamal, was a former Darul Islam fighter and commander for the Banten area in the early 1960s before Darul Islam surrendered to the Indonesian government. He had seven children, four of whom died. The three who survived all became involved in Kang Jaja's group. His son, Agus Ahmad, was inducted into Darul Islam in 1993 by one of his father's protégés and became an employee of CV Sajira in 1999. His daughter, Iis, married Rosihin, also a Sajira employee. The youngest son, Iwan Sujai, also joined DI and the Sajira company.

In addition to the players linked to the company, there were the three candidate suicide bombers, childhood friends from the same village in Cigarung, Sukabumi, whose fathers were Darul Islam members.

Irun Hidayat was also a central figure. Inducted into Darul Islam by Kang Jaja in 1987 at fifteen, he was in the same class at Serang Islamic High School as Imam Samudra and Heri Hafidin, one of the three owners of CV Sajira. He became a close friend of Rois, and the two went to Ambon in January 2002. Irun became a martial arts instructor in the military training sessions run by Kang Jaja and Rois. Since 1999, Irun also had been the local head of the religious council of the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (Perserikatan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia, PPIM). He was to call on a fellow unionist to put up the bombers the night before they struck the embassy.

addition to Ubeid's brother were Dirman, Ade Bahru, Abu Roiroh, and Deny Nugraha.

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ For a discussion of Kang Jaja's involvement in Darul Islam, see Crisis Group Report, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia*, op.

³⁷ Kang Jaja had a 34 per cent share, Awal and Hafidin 33 per cent each.

E. MOBILISING THE NETWORK

As noted, when Rois was approached by Noordin through Urwah, he almost immediately set in motion a new training camp to select suicide bombers as a way of striking at what he called American and Jewish interests.

On 22 June, Urwah accompanied Rois and his uncle, Saptono, to Surabaya where Rois met with Noordin. Noordin asked about the readiness of the suicide bombers, and Rois said three candidates had been selected. Noordin said they would have to be "ripened" through additional religious instruction, and designated a teacher, Baharudin Soleh, for the job. Soleh, who used the alias Abdul Hadi, may have been used to "ripen" the suicide bombers in Bali II as well. He was killed in the April 2006 police raid. He and Jabir – the other man killed in that raid – were classmates at Ngruki in 1993-1994.

On 25 June, Abdul Hadi accompanied Rois back to Bandung. An immediate objective was to find a *pesantren* where the three would-be martyrs could get additional religious instruction under trusted teachers. In a plan apparently orchestrated by Noordin, the *pesantren* would have to take in not only Abdul Hadi and Ubeid's younger brother as unpaid teachers, but also the three candidate martyrs – Apuy alias Epul, Didi alias Rijal, and Heri Golun – as students. Rois asked Irun Hidayat if he knew a likely one. Irun suggested Miftahul Huda in Cikampek, the *pesantren* director agreed, and instruction began on 3 July.³⁸

Whatever the plans had been, they were disrupted by the arrests of Fahim, Adung and others three days later. On 15 July Urwah came to Bandung and told Rois that Noordin and Azhari's whereabouts were now known and they needed his help to find a new place. Rois went to Surabaya the next day to consult with Noordin, and the new priority came to be finding a place for the Malaysians and their followers in the Jakarta area. On 22 July, Noordin, Azhari and entourage, including Hasan from East Java and Heri Sigu Samboja, the young bomb-making apprentice, arrived in the capital, with all the explosive materials.

Rois got Agus Ahmad to put up the group at his house in Cianjur for a few nights. While they were there, word came through that Urwah and Ubeid had been arrested in Solo on 26 July. Noordin ordered his group to move again, putting Rois in charge of the escape. Rois drove Noordin and Azhari to the main mosque in Banten and left them there while he went to see a fellow member of

the Ring Banten group, Pujata, who had been arrested and detained briefly in November 2002 for helping dispose of leftover explosives from the Bali bombs. Pujata was understandably reluctant to get involved again when asked to help find a place for the fugitives, so Rois went to see another member of the Banten group, Fathurochman alias Rochman. He had been detained with Pujata in the same case but agreed to help. As it happened, Rosihin Noor was at Rochman's house when Rois came by, and Rois told him to see that the explosives were moved and that the group at Pesantren Miftahul Huda left immediately.

Rochman found a house in the Anyer area of Banten, and from then on, Noordin and Azhari moved constantly, rarely staying more than four nights in the same place.

On 5 August, at Noordin's instructions, Rois set off to retrieve Heri Golun, who had been selected as the suicide bomber, and buy the Daihatsu vehicle that was used in the bombing. He enlisted the help of Irun Hidayat in both tasks. From then until 17 August, frantic activity – moving the principals, purchasing additional materials for the bombs and raising funds – alternated with lulls, when the operatives went to Internet cafes to pass the time.

On 17 August, Noordin asked Rois to check on Heri Golun's state of mind. When Heri said he was ready, he moved into the house where Noordin and Azhari were and slept in their room at night, so they could give him additional religious counselling.

On 23 August, Rois started to teach Heri Golun how to drive, and on 9 September, the new driver blew himself up in front of the Australian embassy.

F. THE CONNECTION TO CONFLICT AREAS

As noted above, how Urwah and Ubeid, the JI operatives in Solo, knew Iwan alias Rois and that he likely would be able to produce the suicide bombers Noordin sought is an unanswered question. There were already well-established links between JI and the Banten group before Rois came into the picture:

- Kang Jaja and others in the group had been active in Darul Islam before a faction split off and formed Jemaah Islamiyah, so many leaders would have known each other;
- Imam Samudra was reportedly a member of both the Banten group and JI, and maintained ties with his old classmate Heri Hafidin, a leading *ustadz* in the Banten group and part owner of CV Sajira;
- several Banten members were Ngruki alumni, including Abdul Rauf and Andri Octavia, two of those arrested in connection with a robbery to raise funds for the Bali bombing; and

³⁸ Deposition of Iwan Dharmawan Mutho alias Rois alias Fajar alias Abdul Fatah alias Dharma alias Yadi alias Mutho alias Taufik alias Rdho alias Hendi in case dossier of Hasan alias Agus Cahyono alias Dharma, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.